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Lee, Kyeong-Ho, M.S., December 1982. Environmental Studies
Economic Analysis o f  the Residential Fuel-switching Policy o f 
Seoul, Korea (46 pp.)
D irector: John W. D u ff ie ld
The purpose o f th is  study was to (1) provide a value o f l i f e  
based on empirical data fo r  the Korean labor market and (2) apply 
th is  value o f saving a l i f e  to the benefit-cos t analysis o f an 
a i r  p o l lu t io n  control p o l ic y - - re s id e n t ia l  fue l sw itch ing -- in  
Seoul, Korea. The value o f  saving a l i f e  was around $1,150,000, 
using the m u lt ip le  regression technique based on the theory o f 
compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia ls .  The expected improvement o f 
annual ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  fo r  s u l fu r  d ioxide was 22.22 pg per 
cubic meter and 1,012 probable deaths could be saved annually 
by the contro l as a re su lt  o f the reduction o f su lfu r  dioxide 
and carbon monoxide emissions.
Total annual benefits amounted to $1,163.8 m i l l io n  and $134 per 
capita in Seoul. The annualized cost was $302.75 m il l io n  a t a 12 
percent discount rate. These results  present a basis fo r  the 
economic f e a s ib i l i t y  o f the po licy . Further research would 
require a la rger sample size and more information on ind iv idua l 
workers. Also, a dose-response function spec if ic  to the Korean 
s itu a t io n  should be developed.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
The bene fit-cos t technique is  one o f the ana ly t ica l too ls fo r  
decision making fo r  public po licy  or p ro jec ts . I t  is  based on the 
potentia l well-being o f society: "A po licy  is  desirable i f  the gainers
from the po licy could more than compensate the losers i f  the po licy  
were adopted" (7, p. 20). In some contexts, however, i t  might be too 
simple to guide the decisions o f  a p lu r a l is t i c  modern society i f  
d is t r ib u t io n a l e ffec ts  o f the po licy  could not be f u l l y  examined.
There also are c r i t ic is m s  o f th is  technique, especia lly  as an inadequate 
basis fo r  health, safe ty , and environmental regulatory decision making 
(2). Nevertheless, i f  welfare improvements remain one o f the essential 
purposes o f government, benefit-cos t analysis represents a p o te n t ia l ly  
workable method to reach th is  ob jective  (2, p. 531).
This paper examines the benefits and costs o f an a i r  p o l lu t io n  
control po licy  which switches the res iden tia l fuel from coal (b riquet) 
to gas in the c i t y  o f Seoul, Korea. In th is  research, c r i t i c a l  issues 
are the physical benefic ia l changes and the valuation o f them.
For a valuation o f benefits (savings o f  l i f e ) ,  in  Chapter 2 
theore tica l approaches fo r  valuing l i f e  are reviewed including the 
comipensatiyiQ wage differentials approach (w ill ingness to pay). In 
Chapter 3, the value o f l i f e  in Korea is estimated at $1.15 m i l l io n  
based on data fo r  the Korean labor market (by the compensating wage
1
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d i f fe re n t ia ls  approach). The estimates are prelim inary because 
ava ilab le  data and information were h igh ly  aggregated.
In Chapter 4, benefits and costs are examined. The improve­
ment o f  annual ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  measured by s u lfu r  d ioxide (SO2) 
could be as much as 22.22 pg per cubic meter (yg/m^) using the 
G iffo rd  '72 dispersion model (4, p .112). The health benefits 
(savings o f l i f e )  from the reduction o f s u lfu r  dioxide and carbon 
monoxide (CO) emission was 1,012 fewer probable deaths (when 
l in e a r dose-response function was adopted fo r  su lfu r  d ioxide) and 
271 fewer probable deaths (when nonlinear dose-response function 
was adopted fo r  su lfu r  d iox ide).
The annual benefit  was found to be $1,163.8 m i l l io n  ($311.65 
m il l io n  when nonlinear dose-response function was adopted fo r  s u lfu r  
dioxide) and the annualized cost was $302.75 m i l l io n  at a 12 percent 
discount ra te. These find ings ind icate the po licy  is  co s t-e f fe c t ive .  
Other benefits such as m ateria ls , amenities, and house s o i l in g  were not 
examined. Including these benefits would strengthen the basic 
conclusion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2 
VALUATION OF SAVING A LIFE
One o f the most d i f f i c u l t  problems facing a bene fit-cos t 
analyst is the evaluation o f  public po lic ies  or investment which could 
re s u l t  in  the loss or saving o f human l i f e .  Benefit-cost analysis is  
a tool fo r  a l lo ca t ive  decision making in the public  sector. One needs 
to evaluate projects as a l lo ca t ive  decisions to see i f  they increase 
the welfare o f society. One then must examine whether or not a given 
social pro ject to reduce the r is k  o f death would generate benefits 
equal or greater than the expenditure. Some quan t ita t ive  estimates o f 
such benefits are needed.
There are arguments tha t human l i f e  is inv io la b le  and should be 
safeguarded at a l l  costs (6 ) and tha t no monetary equivalent ex is ts  
fo r  human l i f e .  A d d it io n a lly ,  the quan t ita t ive  evaluation o f health 
benefits should not be included in the process o f bene fit-cos t analysis. 
In order to be able to judge via p o l i t ic a l  processes with public 
p a rt ic ip a t io n  (1, pp. 529-531), i t  is  widely believed tha t i t  is  
necessary fo r  society to place a monetary value on human l i f e .  There 
are two major approaches: discounted fu ture  earnings (DFE) and w i l l i n g ­
ness to  pay (WTP).
The DFE approach values human l i f e  by estimating the present 
value o f the income an ind iv idua l would have received had he l ive d . The 
ra tiona le  fo r  th is  approach is  tha t ind iv idua ls  are paid according to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the value of th e ir  output ( l ik e  human c a p i ta l ) ,  therefore the present 
value o f th e ir  fu ture  incomes is  equal to the present value of the 
output they would have produced (7, p. 129).
This approach has been c r i t ic iz e d  because i t  takes account 
only o f soc ie ty 's  loss in national income and ignores a person's 
desire to l iv e  (9, p. 53). As a re s u l t ,  i t  g rea tly  undervalues 
e lde r ly  people and in d iv id u a ls ,  such as housewives, whose work does 
not produce d ire c t  monetary compensation ( i ) .
The WTP approach values l i f e  a t a level determined by each 
in d iv id u a l,  expressed as an amount tha t an ind iv idua l is  w i l l in g  to 
pay to avoid the r is k  o f death. One varian t o f th is  approach is  a 
survey method in which people are asked to respond to hypothetical 
questions. The v a l id i t y  o f survey data is  l im ite d  because people have 
d i f f i c u l t y  in assessing p ro b a b i l i t ie s  of death and determining a 
hypothetical payment they would make fo r  something they do not normally 
purchase (9, p. 54).
Another method is  to in fe r  the price o f facing a greater r is k
o f death from the re la tionsh ip  between the r is k  o f death in  d i f fe re n t
jobs and th e ir  respective wage rates. Details o f th is  method are
discussed and adopted fo r  an empirical estimate of the value o f l i f e .
Compensating Wage D if fe re n t ia ls
Theory
The theory o f compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia ls  was o r ig in a l ly  
conceived by Adam Smith (19). The theory suggests tha t jobs w ith 
disagreeable cha rac te r is t ics  w i l l  command higher wages, other things
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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being equal. This is  because the whole o f the advantages and 
disadvantages o f the d i f fe re n t  employments o f labor must, in the same 
range, be pe rfec t ly  equal or con tinua lly  tending toward equa lity  
(19, p. 99). Disadvantages due to unpleasant working conditions 
must therefore be compensated by advantages o f higher pay.
This theory has awaited the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f large data sets 
fo r  almost two centuries in  order to be em p ir ica lly  tested.^ According 
to Adam Smith's (19) lo g ic ,  the wage rate is  decided by the character­
is t ic s  o f each worker--such as s trength, a g i l i t y ,  in te l l ig e n c e —and 
each dimension o f a job--such as pace o f work, p ro b a b i l i ty  o f in ju ry  
and death, and unpleasantness o f tasks.
A labor market can be viewed as providing a mechanism fo r  
im p l ic i t  trading in cha rac te r is t ics  o f job and workers in a manner 
s im ila r  to t ied  sales. Workers se ll th e ir  labor but a t  the same time 
purchase nonmonetary and psychic aspects o f th e ir  jobs. Firms 
purchase labor but also se ll nonmonetary aspects o f work. When a 
worker is h ired, an employer and employee agree to a s ing le wage rate 
fo r  a job containing numerous cha rac te r is t ics  which are elements o f 
the demand and supply functions relevant to the job.
Equilibrium in the job market is  characterized by market 
equalizing d ifference functions (market clearing im p l ic i t  prices)
(22, pp. 258-282) y ie ld in g  the wage rate associated with each value 
o f job cha ra c te r is t ics . The wage rate therefore embodies a series of 
im p l ic i t  prices at which each o f these job cha rac te r is t ics  is bought 
and so ld --p r ices termed compensating wage differentials (21, p. 340).
The compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia l  on the r is k  o f death (the im p l ic i t
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
marginal price of the r is k  o f death) can be extended to the value o f 
l i f e .
The theory o f hedonic prices outlined by Rosen (18) is  the most 
appropriate framework fo r  analyzing compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia ls  
(21, p. 340). Following Thaler and Rosen (22), Smith (21) and 
Rosen (18) considered jobs in which a l l  aspects but one were a t th e i r  
market clearing im p l ic i t  prices and quan tit ies . For the purpose o f 
i l lu s t r a t io n ,  assume tha t the only job c h a ra c te r is t ic  fo r  which 
equ ilib r ium  value has ye t to be determined is  the r is k  o f in ju ry  
(consider only death). W(p) in Figure 1 is  an equ ilib r ium  function 
when the number o f workers applying fo r  a job a t each level o f r is k  
equals the number o f jobs offered a t each r is k .  W(p) therefore 
serves as an e q u i l ib r ia t in g  device fo r  matching workers and firm s, the 
same role that prices play in the standard market.
In order to analyze a worker's demand fo r  job sa fe ty , i t  is  
assumed tha t workers are productive ly and personally homogeneous 
except in th e ir  a tt i tudes  about r is k .  Workers are assumed to have 
u t i l i t y  function (22, p. 274). Workers choose jobs o f fe r in g  a 
sp e c if ic  r is k  p ro b a b il i ty  and a wage ra te , basing th e ir  decisions on a 
maximization o f expected u t i l i t y .
When an acceptance wage is  defined as a payment to make a 
worker in d if fe re n t  to jobs o f fe r in g  a lte rn a t iv e  r isks  (22, p. 275), 
i t  is  possible to draw workers' r is k  and wage ind iffe rence  curves 
showing, fo r  constant level o f  u t i l i t y ,  the t ra d e -o ff  that each worker 
is  w i l l in g  to make between wages and r is k  leve ls . A worker's demand 
price o f job safety then can be explained by u t i l i t y  maximization.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Note: see tex t fo r  a complete explanation o f the f igu re .
Figure 1. Market equ ilib r ium  of job r is k .
Source :
R. Thaler and S. Rosen, "The Value o f Saving a L i fe :  Evidence
from the Labor Market," Household Production and Consumption, ed. N. E. 
Terlecky (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau o f Economic Research, 1975),
p. 279.
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These ind iffe rence curves o f workers 0 in Figure 1 show tha t 
the acceptance wage is increasing in  r is k  at an increasing ra te ; the 
marginal rate o f subs titu t ion  between job r is k  and wage is  p o s it ive  and 
increasing because o f r is k  aversion, imperfect insurance, and pain and 
su ffe r ing  (22, p. 275). A worker's optimum po in t o f  p (represented by 
p* in Fig. 1) occurs where the budget l in e  and an adjo in ing 
ind ifference curve have a common tangent, tha t i s ,  where W(p*) equals 
0(p*) and W'(p*) equals aO/op*. Then W'(p*) id e n t i f ie s  the marginal 
acceptance wage o f worker 2 at the r is k  p* (82 in Fig. 1 represents 
the ind ifference curve fo r  worker 2). W'(p*) estimates how much money
is necessary to induce worker 2 in to  accepting a small incremental 
r is k ;  a l te rn a t iv e ly ,  how much worker 2 w i l l  pay to reduce r is k  by a 
small amount--which is  exactly the value of l i f e  sought.
For the analysis o f a supply price o f job sa fe ty , consider a 
f i rm 's  behavior as a p r o f i t  maximizer. Labor is  hired to the point 
where wage and marginal product are equal. The re la tionsh ip  between 
wage and r is k  is tha t firms w i l l  reduce r is k  only i f  they can simul­
taneously reduce the wage fo r  a given maximized p r o f i t  leve l.  Marginal 
costs of r is k  prevention would be additiona l market wage payments 
necessary to attract workers to r is k ie r  jobs. Marginal benefits come in 
the form o f add it iona l market output from in s ta l l in g  more safety 
devices ( i t  is  assumed tha t safety increases the marginal product o f 
labor) or cost savings from in s ta l l in g  fewer safety devices.
Thaler and Rosen (22) defined a f i rm 's  o f fe r  function f (p ,  r ), 
where p is r is k  level and r  is  p r o f i t  le v e l,  as an amount a f irm  w i l l ­
ing ly  pays each o f  the optimal number o f workers at a lte rn a t ive  levels 
o f r is k  at a constant p r o f i t .  One then can draw ind iffe rence  curves
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the f irm  in wage and r is k .  Each is o p ro f i t  curve of f irm  1 ($1) and 
f irm  2 ($2) are shown in Figure 1. The assumption tha t the cost o f 
r is k  prevention is  subject to increasing cost is  re flec ted  as a 
concave transformation function o f r is k  and wage.
Equilibrium o f each f irm  is characterized by two conditions:
W(p) equals (f>(p) and W‘ (p) equals a^/ap. Therefore W'(p*) in Figure 
1 also id e n t i f ie s  marginal o f fe r  function where f irm  2 has chosen p* 
op tim a lly . W'(p*) estimates how much f irm  2 w i l l  o f fe r  to a worker 
instead o f reducing a small incremental r is k .
Workers d i f f e r  in  th e ir  a tt i tudes  toward r is k ,  bequest motives, 
and nonlabor income. There consequently is  a d is t r ib u t io n  o f acceptance 
wage functions in the market. Those with less r is k  aversion ( fo r  
example, worker 2 compared to worker 1 in Fig. 1) have smaller marginal 
acceptance wages at each r is k  level and lower reservation prices fo r  a 
r isky  job. In other words, workers with lower marginal acceptance 
wages work on r is k ie r  jobs; the slope at po int A (worker I ' s  marginal 
acceptance wage at r is k  level p*) is steeper than the slope at po in t Q 
(worker 2 's marginal acceptance wage a t r is k  level p*).
The o f fe r  functions depend on the nature o f production functions 
in  various firms and industr ies  and on corresponding d is t r ib u t io n  o f 
safety technology. Firms therefore w i l l  not a l l  have the same set o f 
o f fe r  function. Firm 2 in Figure 1, fo r  example, finds i t  more costly  
a t the margin to achieve a given level o f safety than does f irm  I ;  the 
slope o f a^2/ap at point Q is  la rger than the slope o f ar+Z/otp at point
B. Now one sees tha t a worker with less r is k  aversion (worker 2) finds 
i t  optimal to take a job with the f irm  o ffe r in g  the higher wage and less
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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safety ( f irm  2) because safety is  not as valuable to him and vice 
versa.
I f  there is  a large number o f firms and workers, the 
equ ilib rium  points w i l l  f i l l  out the W(p) l in e .  I t  is  apparent tha t 
W(p) is  the lower envelope o f a fam ily  o f acceptance wage functions 
and represents an upper envelope o f the d is t r ib u t io n  o f o f fe r  
functions. This envelope W(p) in Figure 1 is  assumed to have a 
pos it ive  slope and is  concave from below {W'(p) > 0, W"(p) < 0), 
as Rosen (18) argued, i f  there are increasing marginal costs o f supply­
ing safety across firms or industries and i t  is  impossible to untie any 
package of job cha rac te r is t ics  and se ll  safety separately.^
The model specified above assumes productive ly and personally 
homogeneous workers; but, in  real markets, worker cha rac te r is t ics  are 
d i f fe re n t .  These worker cha rac te r is t ics  (c) have d i f fe re n t  e ffec ts  on a 
worker's acceptance wage function and f i rm 's  production function 
(eventually o f fe r  func t ion ). Taking these ch a rac te r is t ics  in to  account, 
the market equ ilib r ium  can be defined as the market wage-risk, 
charac te r is t ics  equalizing d ifference function W(p, c) (22, p. 283), 
which can be assumed to be an add itive  function o f r is k  and character­
is t ic s .
One important issue is  the p o s s ib i l i ty  tha t r is k  a ffec ts  
p rod u c t iv ity  in a nonhomogeneous manner w ith respect to various 
p ro d u c t iv ity  ind ica to rs . In other words, there are in te rac tions  between 
r is k  and worker c h a ra c te r is t ic s . I f  th is  is true , there w i l l  be more 
than one market equ ilib rium  curve and these curves need not have the 
same slope at each level o f r is k .  Empirical studies show in te rac t ion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between r is k  and age, marita l s ta tus, un ion iza tion , and race. Thaler 
(22) and Olson (17) have c le a r ly  shown the pos it ive  in te rac t ion  o f 
unionization and r is k  to the wage premium.
The compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia ls  approach requires two 
assumptions:3 ( 1) perfect information on the employment opportun it ies
and the risks associated w ith a job as measurable p ro b a b i l i t ie s  and 
(2) perfect m o b il i ty  o f  workers to change th e ir  occupations. These 
assumptions provide c r i t i c a l  l im ita t io n s  to th is  market approach 
(9 p. 53).
Empirical Applications
As discussed in  the theore tica l analysis above, the goal is  to 
estimate the equalizing d iffe rence function W(p, c ). The slope of 
W'(p) then estimates the im p l ic i t  supply and demand price to a r isky  
job. The s ta t is t ic a l  method o f m u lt ip le  regression analysis is  used 
fo r  empirical work.
Generally, four types o f independent variables are used to 
control fo r  factors determining wage rate other than job r is k .  These 
are the worker charac te ris t ics--such  as age, education, marita l s ta tus , 
and race--and other cha rac te r is t ics  o f a job such as unionization.
Dummy variables also are used fo r  co n tro l l in g  ch a ra c te r is t ic  d i f f e r ­
ences in occupations (e .g . ,  laborer, operatives or service worker) and 
industries (e .g . ,  manufacturing or se rv ice ), and fo r  co n tro l l in g  
regional wage differences and wage d iffe rence in sex. The square term 
o f  r is k  may be included to allow fo r  non linea rity  (22, p. 285).
Two types o f  data generally are used in attempts to measure 
compensating wage d i f fe re n t ia ls .  One approach is to match information
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on ind iv idua l workers to the information on r is k  rates by occupation"* 
or industry.® Another type o f data base contains se lf-reported  
ind iv idua l spec if ic  job ch a rac te r is t ics  in add it ion  to the usual data 
co llected fo r  ind iv id u a ls ;  fo r  example, surveys on working conditions 
contain self-assessed q u a l i ta t iv e  measures o f job dangers, work pace, 
freedom in the job , etc.® The variables generally used fo r  m u lt ip le  
regression analysis are summarized in Table 1 (see also Table 2).
Table 3 shows some estimates o f previous research on the value o f l i f e .
The resu lts  o f the studies are d i f fe re n t  due to data sp e c if ic  
reasons or va r ia tion  in regression modelling. Olson (17, pp. 176-178) 
explained tha t data on very r isky  jobs underestimate the estimated 
value (e .g .,  Thaler and Rosen’ s [22] study). This can be expected 
th e o re t ica l ly  as shown in Figure 1 .  ̂ Also, Olson's tests showed that 
a l inea r model w ithout the squared term, r is k  o f death, w i l l  under­
estimate the estimated value o f l i f e  on safer jobs and overstate fo r  
r is k ie r  jobs (e .g . .  Smith's study, 20). This is consistent with the 
assumed concavity o f the W(p) l in e .
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Table 1
Independent Variables and Expected Sign o f C oe ff ic ien t
Independent variable Expected sign
Dummy Variables*
Location
Sex -
Race —
Union _
Marital Status -
Continuous Variables
Age +
Age squared
Education +
Education squared -
Hours Worked +
Risk o f Death +
Risk o f Death squared -
In ju ry  Risk +
In ju ry  Severity +
See Table 2.
Sources :
R. Thaler and S. Rosen, "The Value o f Saving a L i fe :  Evidence
from the Labor Market," Household Production and Consumption, ed. N. E. 
Terlecky (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau o f Economic Research, 1975),
p. 192.
C. A. Olson, "An Analysis o f Wage D if fe re n t ia ls  Received by 
Workers on Dangerous Jobs," Journal o f  llionan h’csourccs, 16(2) (Spring, 
1981), 174-175.
R. A. Mclean, Wayne R. Wendling, and Paul R. Neergaard, "Com­
pensating Wage D if fe re n t ia ls  fo r  Hazardous Work: An Empirical Analys is ,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 18(3) (Autumn, 1978), 102- 
103.
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Table 2
Coding o f Discrete Variables
Location 0 Resident o f SMSA
1 Not resident o f  SMSA
Sex 0 Male
1 Female
Race 0 White
1 A1 others
Union 0 Union
1 Nonunion
Marita l Status 0 Married (spouse)
1 A ll others
Source:
R. A. Mclean, Wayne R. Wendling, and Paul R. Neergaard, "Com­
pensating Wage D if fe re n t ia ls  fo r  Hazardous Work: An Empirical Ana lys is ,"
Quarterly Review of Eoonomios and Business^ 18(3), (Autumn, 1978), 102 
and 105.
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Table 3 
Estimated Value o f L ife
Study
Approximate percent 
r is k  d i f fe re n t ia l *
Value o f 
l i f e  ($ ) t
Smith (20) 2-3 1.5 X 1Q6
Thaler and Rosen (22) 2-4 .2 X 10*
Viscusi (27) 2-3 1.5 X 10*
Olson (17) 3 .7 -3 .8 3.5 X 10*
Brown (3) 1 .5 X 10*
A percentage o f average wages fo r  workers in the sample.
t The d o l la r  value is  not adjusted fo r  i t s  present value.
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ENDNOTES
^The investigations by Smith (20) and Thaler and Rosen (22) 
started to consider the wage premium for death risk faced by workers.
^Smith (21, p. 340) and Rosen (18, p. 51). Smith, Viscusi 
(27), and Olson (17) support Rosen's argument— concavity of W(p)—  
applying it as a basic hypothesis in empirical studies. Thaler 
(22, p. 282), however, argued that concavity of W(p) is not necessarily 
true. He stated that only the distortion from perfect linearity (con­
sistent with Adam Smith's equalization differentials [22, p. 272]) is 
due to risk aversion and imperfect insurance, etc.
^Adam Smith (19, p. 114) also suggested similar assumptions: 
"three things are requisite even where there is the most freedom. First, 
the employments must be well known and long established in the neighbor­
hood; secondly, they must be the sole or principal employments of those 
who occupy them; and thirdly, they must be in their natural state."
^See Thaler and Rosen (22).
^See Smith (21) and Olson (17).
®See Viscusi (28).
^In Figure 1, the slope at point A (marginal accepted wage of 
worker 1 at risk level p*) is larger than the slope at point Q (worker 
2). Using data on very risky jobs therefore underestimates average 
demand price for safety and the estimate probably will be biased down­
ward when extrapolated to the population as a whole (detailed in Thaler 
and Rosen [22, pp. 280 and 282]).
15
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Chapter 3
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF LIFE 
The Model
The equation to be estimated is
W = A + + e, [ 1]
where A = constant term.
= c o e f f ic ie n ts .
X = variables o f worker's cha rac te r is t ics  and job 
ch a ra c te r is t ic s ,  and
e = e rro r  term.
When defin ing r is k  as a fa ta l or nonfatal accident p ro b a b il i ty ,  
as Olson (17, pp. 169-171) discussed, p r inc ipa l hypotheses on the 
risk-wage re la t io n  can be summarized as fo llows;
1. As the r is k  of fa ta l accident increases, wage increases 
but a t a decreasing wage (W'(p) > 0, W"(p) < 0).
2. The nonfatal accident premium increases as accident frequency 
and severity  increase.
Based on these hypotheses, and adding r is k  variab les, DTH,
FR, and SV, equation [1 ] becomes equation [2 ] .
W = A + BiDTH + Bz(DTH)^ + B3FR + B,SV + BX + e, [2 ]
17
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where DTH = the p ro b a b i l i ty  o f death,
FR = the p ro b a b il i ty  o f  experiencing an accident tha t
resu lts  in  the loss o f at least one day, and
SV = the average number o f workdays lo s t  per lost-workday 
in ju ry .
The Data
Worker data were drawn from the Re-port on Occupational Wage 
Survey (ROWS) in 1980 (13), published by The M in is try  o f  Labor,
The Republic o f Korea. Only aggregate data on workers in small
industries were ava ilab le  from the ROWS (e .g . ,  the average wage o f 
workers in  the coal mining indus try ) .  In dus tr ia l accident data in  
1981 (14) reported by The M in is try  o f Labor o f Korea were matched 
to aggregate data on workers. In a sample o f small indus tr ies ,
25 could be matched. Information on in ju ry  frequency and severity 
were availab le only fo r  broad industry groups; therefore , they were 
used fo r  each small industry w ith in  a broad industry c la s s i f ic a t io n  
(Table 4).
Available variables and th e ir  mean values and standard devia­
tions are summarized in  Table 5. ROWS data allow estimating of three 
equations ( fo r  male workers, female workers, and aggregate). Monthly 
earnings were the dependent variab les.
Due to a lack o f in form ation, many potentia l variables were 
not usable. Of p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t  were education and the in te rac t ion  
term between r is k  and un ion ization. In add it ion , variables fo r  con­
t r o l l i n g  the wage d ifferences between urban and nonurban area, and 
d ifferences in  regional d is t r ib u t io n ,  could not be used.
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Table 4
Risk o f Death, In ju ry  Frequency, and Severity o f Industries
Industry
Risk
death* In ju ry t
Sever­
i t y  t
Mining 57.8 318
Coal 402
Metal 214
Others 196
Manufacturi ng 11.3 122
Food 21
T e x ti le  and i t s  products 5
Wood products 18
Pulp and paper 60
P rin ting  and binding 12
Chemical products 26
Coal products 72
Ceramics and pottery 21
Rubber products 13
Glass 11
Nonmetal l i e  products or m e ta ll ic  processing 23
Machi nery 30
E le c tr ic  machinery 10
Transport equipment 40
U t i l i t i e s 6.5 207
E le c t r ic i t y  and gas 103
Construction 51 12.6 138
Transport and Storage 15.9 70
Land transportation 85
Sea transportation 149
A ir  transportation 14
Related services 78
Mean (Standard Error)
Sample 73 20.8 171
(91) (20.9) (96)
A ll industries 68 12.25 114
(79)
Footnotes appear on the next page.
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Footnotes fo r  Table 4
*
N of Death  ̂
N of Workers
^The p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  experiencing an accident resu lts  in the loss 
o f a t least one workday in  every working hour (scaled by 1,000,000):
N of Accidents ^ ^qg
Total work hours of all workers
‘"Average number o f workdays lo s t  per lost-workday in ju ry :
N of Lost Workdays 
N of Injuries
Note: In f  and $ in ju r ie s  contain occupational diseases.
Source:
M in is try  o f Labor, "Analysis o f Indus tr ia l Accidents" (Seoul, 
Korea: The Republic o f Korea, 1981), pp. 61-67.
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Table 5
Summary S ta t is t ic s  : Mean (Standard Error)
Equation
Variable L U * L2Jt l3J t
Risk Death 70.76 70.76 70.76
(90.36) (90.36) (90.36)
In ju ry  Frequency 17.48 17.48 17.48
(15.33) (15.33) (15.33)
Severi ty 141.24 141.24 141.24
(71.96) (71.96) (71.96)
Age 31.01 33.04 25.90
(3.83) (2 .72) (3 .66)
Experience 4.06 4.66 2.30
(1 .12) (1 .09) (0 .47)
Years Same Firm 3.12 3.46 2.04
(1.15) (1 .12) (0 .49)
Work Hours 230.24 230.08 228.36
(18.71) (18.03) (21.20)
Earnings (W-)§ 187,400.28 216,784.40 104,232.20
(58,344.69) (51,292.02) (24,696.35)
No. o f Cases 25 25 25
Equation [1 ] is  fo r  the aggregate o f workers.
^Equation [2 ]  is  fo r male workers.
^Equation [3 ]  is  fo r  female workers.
^Earnings include the regular monthly payment, overtime payment,
and yearly  extra bonus divided by 12.
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The Estimation
The f i r s t  run without a square term resulted in inco rrec t signs 
o f  co e ff ic ie n ts .  This indicates tha t the re la tionsh ip  between r is k  and 
wage rate probably is  nonlinear. In another run, a square term o f risk 
o f death and square terms o f the in ju ry  and age were added. The 
estimates showed strong m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  between independent variables. 
The in te rco rre la t io n  between the variab le  risk death and the variables 
injury rate^ severity^ and age had the most extreme col l in e a r i t y .  The 
co rre la t ion  co e ff ic ie n ts  are presented in Table 6. Consequently, when 
other variables were added in a stepwise regression a f te r  entering the 
variab le  fo r  the risk o f death, the estimated c o e f f ic ie n t  on the r is k  
o f death became in s ig n i f ic a n t  and large. This re su lt  might, in pa rt,  be 
due to h ighly aggregated data.
A conservative and s ig n i f ic a n t  estimate resu lts  when a l l  other 
variables except the variable risk death and i t s  square term were 
omitted { re s tr ic te d  to the constant term). The resu lts  are summarized 
in Table 7. The estimate is  conservative because the apparent e f fe c t  
o f omitted variables is  to bias the c o e f f ic ie n t  on r is k  downward.
The theory requires the wage-risk function to be p o s it iv e ly  
increasing a t a decreasing ra te . The resu lts  are consistent w ith th is  
hypothesis (W'{p) > 0, W"(p; < 0). The F s ta t i s t i c  is  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  
the r is k  death variable a t 5 percent, one-ta iled le v e l,  only in equation 
[1 ] (aggregate data), F = 3.670. The explanatory power (R^) in each 
equation also was small.
The c o e f f ic ie n t  o f r isk*death variab le  ( r is k  d i f f e r e n t ia l )  is  
670.6727 in equation [1 ] ,  which means th a t jobs with extra r is k  o f one
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Table 6 
Correlation C oe ff ic ien ts*
Variablet
Variable
3 4 5 6 7 8
4 0.84$
5 0.75 0.87
6 0.67 0.58 0.47
7 0.60 0.47 0.61 0.61
8 0.25 0.02 -0.01 0.54 0.59
9 -0.59 -0.46 -0.41 -0 .49 -0.67 -0.52
•k
Correlation c o e ff ic ie n ts  are s ta t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  a t the 
5 percent level i f  I r I  > 0.40 fo r  the 25 sample-size.
fVariab le  3 = Risk Death, variable 4 = In ju ry ,  variable 5 = 
Severity , variable 6 = Age, variable 7 = Years Same Firm, variable 8 = 
Experience, variable 9 = Work Hours.
^The numbers are from equation [1 ] .
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Table 7
Regression Results fo r  W(p, c)
24
Independent Equation
variable LU L2J ■........ T 3 ]
Constant 157,259 203,070 97,847
Risk Death 670.6727*
(350.0782)t
323.7307
(331.6019)
144.3245
(159.8394)
Risk Death squared -1.3481
(0.9527)
-0.7157
(0.9024)
-0.2980
(0.4350)
R2 0.18 0.05 0.04
No. o f  Cases 25 25 25
S ig n if ica n t at the 5 percent one-ta iled level
t Standard errors are in parentheses
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death per 100,000 persons pay 670.6727 won (Korean currency: W) per
month more than jobs w ith less r is k .  This amounts to W- 8,048.0724 per 
year. The im p l ic i t  value o f a probable death then is W 804,807,240 
(670.6727 X 12 x iQ : ) .
Each equation presents d i f fe re n t  c o e f f ic ie n ts ,  resu lt ing  in 
d i f fe re n t  estimations o f im p l ic i t  value o f l i f e ;  W 804,807,240 
(equation [ 1 ] } ,  W 388,476,840 (equation [ 2 ] ) ,  and W 173,189,400 
(equation [3 ] ) .  The r is k  d i f fe re n t ia ls  o f each equation occupy about
0.36 percent (equation [ I ] ) ,  0.15 percent (equation [ 2 ] ) ,  and 0.14 
percent (equation [3 ] )  o f  the average wage o f the sample, respective ly , 
which are very small compared to those o f other studies (see Table 3). 
The d i f fe re n t  estimations in each equation may be due to using 
aggregate data and om itting some variables.
In th is  study, the estimate of W-804,807,240 in equation [1 ] 
(aggregate) is  adopted. In d o l la r  terms, the im p l ic i t  value o f l i f e  
is  $1,150,000 at an exchange rate o f 700 won per d o l la r .
Further Research
This estimation procedure was performed with l im ite d  data and 
inform ation, especia lly  ind iv idua l worker cha rac te r is t ics  such as educa­
t io n .  Also, the re s u l t  is  biased due to re s t r ic t in g  certa in  variables 
to  the constant term. The d ire c t ion  of bias appears, however, to be 
downward. Accordingly, fo r  purposes o f po licy  analys is, the re su lt  may 
be applied w ith the caveat tha t i t  possibly is  conservative and, in any 
case, somewhat pre lim inary. This view is  supported when compared to 
the other empirical studies previously reported. In order to obtain
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be tte r estimates, data on ind iv idua l workers and more variables would 
be needed fo r  the analysis.
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Chapter 4
CASE STUDY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RESIDENTIAL
FUEL-SWITCHING POLICY IN SEOUL
In the c i t y  o f Seoul, the main res iden tia l fue ls are o i l  and 
coal (b r iq u e t) i  most fam ilies  use briquets (Table 8). In the case o f 
SO2 a i r  p o l lu t io n ,  13.6 percent o f  annual emissions was due to 
domestic b r iquet burning in the Seoul area in  1979 (Table 9). The 
annual ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  measured by SO2 was 0.0876 ppm in 1979 
(15, p. 160). Specia lly devised briquets are used fo r  the conventional 
on~dol heating system. Coal consumptions per fam ily and to ta l are 
shown in  Table 10.
Main a i r  po llu tan ts  emitted from briquet burning are SO2, CO, 
and nitrogen oxides (NO^). The emission o f p a rt icu la te  matters is 
n e g lig ib le  due to the special manufacturing process fo r  briguets (15, 
p. 28). The stack height o f houses does not exceed 10 meters and com­
pa ra t ive ly  low temperature o f f lu e  gas leads to l im ite d  buoyancy, thus 
producing high ground level concentration. Moreover, the high density 
o f  emission sources compounds the problem. Also, CO gas creates fa ta l 
accidents by i n f i l t r a t i n g  in to  a room through the wall or f lo o r .
The Korean government has t r ie d  to switch the res iden tia l fuel 
to natural gas. Such a po licy  would re su lt  in some benefits from 
improved a i r  qua lity --such  as reduced damages to human health, aesthetics, 
m ateria ls , vegetation, and animals--and required costs fo r  implementation. 
This case study analyzes the benefits and costs of the po licy . A complete
27
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Table 8
Types o f Heating System, Seoul, 1979
Type N o f family N in  Km^*
Oil heating system 117,017 187
Coal heating system 1,642,731 2,620
Totals 1,759,748 1,801
Divided by the area o f Seoul: 627 Km̂ .
Source :
National In s t i tu te  o f Environment, "The Atmospheric Dispersion 
o f A ir  Pollutants in Seoul (Seoul, Korea: The Republic of Korea,
1980), p. 22.
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Table 9
Source and Amount o f Emission (Sog), Seoul, 1979
Category Amount (Ton/yr) Percent
Domestic coal 
Power p lant 
Automobiles
Indus tr ia l and commercial 
Totals
23,779
44,839
41,578
64,715
175,011
13.6
25.6 
23.8 
37.0
100.0
Source:
National In s t i tu ts  o f Environment, "The Atmospheric Dispersion 
o f A i r  Pollutants in  Seoul (Seoul, Korea; The Republic o f Korea, 
1980), p. 28.
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Table 10
Domestic Coal Consumption and SO2 Emission, Seoul, 1979
Consumption (year) Emission
Wt. (Ton) N o f briquet (Ton)
6,584,900 1,829 X 10* 23,779
4* 1,113 14.5 Kg
★
Per fam ily.
Source:
National In s t i tu te  of Environment, "The Atmospheric Dispersion 
o f A ir  Po llutants in Seoul (Seoul, Korea: The Republic of Korea,
1980), 23-24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
b ene fit-cos t analysis o f the po licy  is  not, however, possible at th is  
time; the bene fit  analysis is  re s tr ic te d  to human health.
Methodology
Two general types o f information are needed to analyze a i r  
p o l lu t io n  con tro l:  physical re la tionsh ips and values. The physical
re la tionsh ips  include (1) the re la tion sh ip  between actual source 
sp e c if ic  emissions and the ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  (usually determined by 
s u f f ic ie n t  monitoring data or by dispersion modelling), (2) the e f fe c t  
o f given ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  level on receptors such as humans, animals, 
p lan ts , or materials (dose-response fu n c t io n ),  and (3) control tech­
nology.
Given expected physical re la t ionsh ips , the value o f l i f e  presented 
in Chapter 3 is  used to evaluate health benefits . The costs o f the 
po licy  implementation include cap ita l costs and additional fuel costs of 
switching to a gas heating (and cooking) system. By comparing the 
aggregated present value o f  benefits and costs (aggregated net bene­
f i t s ) ,  gas fo r  coal su b s t itu t io n  po licy  can be examined fo r  economic 
e ff ic ie n c y .
Physical Relationships
Dispersion Model
Many dispersion models have been developed. They a l l  are 
va r ia tions  of a basic Gaussian model. The d ifference between models 
is  the degree of de ta i l  considered in  the input or output data (25, 
p. 16). Generally, required data fo r  dispersion models are (1) sources
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o f emission (p o in t,  l in e ,  or area), (2) meteorological data to describe 
transport and dispersion in the atmosphere--wind speed and d ire c t io n ,  
atmospheric turbulance and mixing, (3) receptor s i te s ,  and (4) back­
ground a i r  q u a li ty  (natural and nearby sources).
In Seoul, the emission sources (coal burning fam ilies )  are 
regarded as w e ll-d is t r ib u te d  and homogeneous small p o llu t io n  sources. 
They are c la s s if ie d  as area sources because every source emits p o l lu ­
tants a t almost the same emission rate (using the same type of briquet 
and heating equipment).
As models fo r  SO2 area sources in urban areas, the C limatologi- 
cal Dispersion Model, Box Model, and Gifford-Hanna Model are recommended 
fo r  evaluating the long-term impact o f urban multisource complexes (25, 
p. 21). Area sources ty p ic a l ly  are treated as a square g rid  network 
with p o llu t io n  emissions d is tr ib u te d  re la t iv e ly  uniformly w ith in  each 
square g r id .
In th is  study, the simple G iffo rd  '72 model (24, pp. 112-120) is 
used fo r  the ca lcu la t ion  o f improvements in the ambient a i r  q u a li ty .  
Frank G ifford  and Steve Hanna have suggested the fo llow ing formula:
X = C X g  , [ 3 ]
where X = the concentration o f the p o llu tan t (pg/m^),
C = a dimensionless constant (Hanna suggested 50 fo r  SO?, and 
225 fo r  ISP),
Q = an average area emission rate (pg/m^ per second), and
U = the mean wind speed (m/sec).
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Improvement o f Ambient A ir  Quality (SO2)
Changing re s iden tia l fuel to gas resu lts  in reduction o f 
p o l lu ta n t  emissions: SOg, CO, and NO .̂ The dose-response function of
SO2 is  r e la t iv e ly  well developed, but the others are not. In th is  study, 
there fo re , expected health e ffec ts  are discussed fo r  SO2 and the l i f e  
savings from CO poisoning. The required amount o f  natural gas to 
subs titu te  fo r  briquets is  764.86 x lO^m^ annually and the expected SO2 
emissions from gas burning is 7 Ton annually as summarized in Table 11.
Given the G iffo rd  '72 model, the ambient SO2 a i r  q u a li ty  is  
reduced as a l in e a r  proportion o f emissions. In these ca lcu la tions , 
i t  was assumed tha t briquet burning and gas burning systems have the same 
conversion e f f ic ie n c y . A c tu a lly ,  the heat conversion e ff ic ie n cy  o f gas 
might be higher than tha t o f coa l, therefore th is  assumption makes the 
re s u l t  o f analysis conservative.
The expected reduction o f SO2 emission is  23,772 Ton/yr (Table 
11) and the expected reduction o f  ambient SO2 a i r  q u a li ty  is  22.22 yg/m^ 
(see Endnote 1). According to the G iffo rd  '72 model, however, a s ingle 
large emission source such as a power p lant should have been dea lt with 
separately (24, p. 115). This also makes the re su lt  o f analysis con­
serva tive ; the reduction o f SO2 ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  estimated above 
might be less than tha t when a s ing le  large emission source (power 
p lant in Seoul) is  dealt w ith separately.
Health Benefi t s  f ro m SO, Reduction
In order to evaluate health bene fits , i t  is  necessary to define 
a dose-response function which is  the co rre la t ion  between ambient a i r  
q u a l i ty  and health e f fe c ts .  The dose-response function may be estimated
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Table 11
Required Gas Consumption and SO; Emission
Type
Amount of 
consumption 
per fam ily Total Emission
Coal (Ton/yr) 4.0 6,584,900 23,779 Ton/yr
N o f briquet 1,113.47 1,829 X 10%
Gas (m^/yr) 465.63* 764.86 X lO*t 7 Ton/yrî
1,113.47 X 4,600 Kcal = X m̂ x 11,000 Kcal.
t( l ,829  X 10*) X 4,600 = Y x 11,000.
Heat Value: Briquet: 4,600 Kcal per 1 briquet.
Gas: 11,000 Kcal per cubic meter.
C ity o f  Seoul, Korea, Report on Feasibility Study of LNG 
Supply in Seoul (Seoul, Korea: The Republic o f Korea, 1982), pp. 331 
and 333).
^Sulfur content o f  natural gas is  4.6 Kg/10*m^. U.S. ERA, 
Compilation of Air Voliutant Emission Factors, Ap-42 (Research Triangle 
Park, N.C.: Research Laboratory, O ffice of Research and Development,
1973), pp. 4.73 and A-4. Then,
4 .6  ^ 764.86 x o K ° -  = 7036 Kg.
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via con tro lled  laboratory experiments; however, e th ica l and legal con­
s iderations p ro h ib i t  the use o f humans fo r  experimental purposes.
Because o f th is ,  epidemiological studies so fa r  have not been f r u i t f u l  
in  id e n t i fy in g  the true cause-effect re la t ionsh ip  underlying m o rta l i ty  
and a i r  p o l lu t io n  {10, p. 18),
Generally, m u lt ip le  regression techniques are used with e p i­
demiological data where the m o rta l i ty  rate is corre lated to factors 
a f fe c t in g  m o r ta l i ty  rates. Examples o f such factors are physical (age, 
sex, race), socioeconomic (income, occupation, housing fu e l) ,  
environmental ( a i r  p o llu t io n  leve ls , c lim ato log ica l cha ra c te r is t ics ,  
domestic fu e ls ) ,  and personal (smoking, n u t r i t io n )  (8, p. 10),
Experiments on the acute to x ic i t y  o f  po llu tan ts to animals f r e ­
quently have produced dose-response functions of sigmoid form. As a 
re s u l t ,  the sigmoid form often is  assumed to be appropriate fo r  the 
e ffec ts  o f p o llu t io n  on human health (7, p. 105). Numerous studies, 
however, have used l in e a r  dose-response functions, Halvorson and 
Ruby (7, pp. 99-123) reviewed previous studies and suggested that the 
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f SO2 in  the m u lt ip le  regression equation was 0.04 x 10"“* 
(0.04 incremental annual death per 10,000 persons per pg/m^ change in 
annual average ambient a i r  q u a l i ty  o f SO2).
Liu and Yu (10) conducted a two-step regression in order to 
u t i l i z e  a nonlinear dose-response function . In the f i r s t  step, a 
l in e a r  m u lt ip le  regression model was developed fo r  estimating the 
e ffec ts  o f the socioeconomic, demographic, and c lim ato log ica l factors 
w ith exclusion o f a i r  p o l lu t io n  on the conventional m o rta l i ty  rate.
The SO2 variable then was regressed on the residual m o rta l i ty  rate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
(subtract the computed m o rta l i ty  rate in  the f i r s t  step from the 
observed gross m o rta l i ty  ra te ) .  Their re su lt  fo llows:
RMR = EXP (1.25 - 25.52/SOz), [4]
where RMR = the residual m o rta l i ty  rate (1 death per 10,000 
persons) and
SO2 = pg/m^.
The expected reduction o f SO2 is 22,22 pg/m^ as derived above. 
The annual ambient SO2 a i r  q u a l i ty  is  229,6 at pg/m^ (0,08763 ppm). 
Health benefits o f  SO2 reduction are summarized in Table 12, Halvorson 
and Ruby's (7) estimate resulted in 774 fewer probably deaths annually 
in Seoul and Liu and Yu's (10) estimate resulted in 33 fewer probable 
deaths annually in  the same area. The l in e a r  model probably over­
states the response at high level concentrations o f p o llu t io n .
L ife  Savings from CO Poisoning
Even though there has been technical improvements of the 
domestic on-dol and public  warning systems based on d a ily  metero- 
log ica l conditions such as wind speed and humidity, fa ta l accidents 
have continued to occur. These CO poisonings were indoor accidents.
Only accident data fo r  the e n t ire  country are ava ilab le  at the 
present, therefore the number o f fa ta l accidents was figured a r b i t r a r i l y  
as 238 f a t a l i t i e s  according to the proportion o f population (one fourth 
o f the fa ta l  accidents: 950 in  1977) (16, p. 66). The 238 fa ta l i t ie s
could be regarded as savings from CO poisoning by changing the fuel 
to gas. The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  fa ta l  accidents inside the house would be 
n e g lig ib le .
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Table 12
Estimates o f  Health Benefits from SO2 Reduction
Model Per 10,000 Seoul c i t y  *
Linear 0.889 774 (0.889 X 870)
Nonlinear 0.037 33 (0.037 X 870)
*
The population o f Seoul was 8,700,000 in 1980.
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Valuation of Health Benefits
Benefits from SO2 and CO reductions are fewer probable deaths: 
1,012 (271 by nonlinear model fo r  SO2) in Seoul. Placing the value o f 
l i f e  a t $1,150,000 presents $1,163.8 m i l l io n  ($311.65 m il l io n  by 
nonlinear model fo r  SO2) as annual benefits and $134 per person ($36 
per person by nonlinear model) annually. When considering the 
l i fe t im e  o f gas burning equipment at 30 years, the aggregated present 
value o f benefits w i l l  be $9,374.4 m i l l io n  ($2,510.3 m il l io n  by 
nonlinear model) a t  a 12 percent discount rate as shown in Table 13.
Costs
Costs o f re s iden tia l fuel switching to gas include fixed costs 
in the i n i t i a l  year fo r  heating equipment, a cooking stove, and indoor 
p ip ing, variab le  add it iona l costs fo r  gas and operation, and main­
tenance costs. Operation and maintenance costs are not considered 
herein because they are ne g lig ib le . As summarized in Table 14, to ta l 
f ixed  cost is $1,455 m i l l io n  in the i n i t i a l  year and the additional 
fuel cost is  $123.07 m i l l io n  annually.
When comparing two fuel costs, the price o f each fuel is  
assumed as constant. In order to be compared to the benefits , these 
costs were converted to annualized value. In th is  case, the l i fe t im e  
o f  f ixed  equipment is  assumed to be 30 years, but the l i fe t im e  of indoor 
pipes is expected to be 60 years. The annualized cost o f indoor pipes 
was calculated through 60 years. The annualized cost was $302.75 
m i l l io n  and $238.13 m i l l io n  at the 7 percent discount rate (Table 15).
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Table 13
Aggregate Present Value of Benefits
Method
L ife
saving
Annual
value
Aggregate value 
12% 7%
Linear 1,012 1,163.8 9,374.4 14,441.6
Nonlinear 271 311.65 2,510.3 3,867.3
M il l io n  d o lla rs .
Note: the discount rate o f 7 percent is  the same as the rate
required by the Energy Security Act o f 1980 (P.L. 96-294). Twelve per­
cent is  a typ ica l nominal ra te.
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Table 14 
Costs fo r  Switching Fuel to Gas
Category Amount (won)
Fixed Costs
In s ta l l in g 150 X 1,000
Indoor piping 100 X 1,000
Equipment
Stove 52 X 1,000
B o ile r* 318 X 1,000
Per fam ily 620 X 1,000
To ta ls t 1,018,493.2 X IQG 
(854,220.1 X IQG)!
Fuel Costs
Gas§ 365,982.9 x 10*
Briquet'' 279,837 X IQG
Additional cost 86,145 X 10*
The b o i le r  is  fo r  a water c irc u la t in g  heating system.
^The number o f coal heating fam ilies is  1,642,731 (see Table 8).
^The fixed  cost without indoor piping cost.
§The price of gas is  W 43.5 per 1,000 Kcal** (source l is te d  
below, p. 317). Required gas consumption is  8,413,400 m il l io n  Kcal 
per year,
"the price  o f  briquets is  W- 153; to ta l briquet consumption is 
1,829 m il l io n  (see Table 10).
W- 43.5/1,000 Kcal = W 10,961.32/M illion BTU = $15.67/M il l ion  
BTU at 3.9685 BTU/Kcal.
Source:
C ity  o f Seoul, Korea, Report o» feas t& fZ tfy  gtud# o f  aupp/y 
in  Seoul (Seoul, Korea: The Republic o f  Korea, 1982), p. 333, and Tables
7.9 and 6.6.
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Category Total* Annual*
Fixed Cost 1,455.99 179.68
(115.06)
Without indoor piping 1,220.31 151.49
(98.34)
Indoor piping 234.68 28.19
(16.72)
Fuel Cost 123.07
Total 302.75
(238.13)
M il l io n  d o l la rs .
Note; the exchange rate is  W- 700 per d o l la r .  The discount 
rate is  12 percent {7% in parentheses).
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Analysis and Policy Recommendation
In Table 16, the annual health benefits estimated, using both 
the l in e a r  and nonlinear dose-response function , are la rger than the 
annualized cost and, thus, show the d e s ira b i l i t y  o f res iden tia l fu e l-  
switching po licy  in  Seoul. Although the re su lt  o f th is  case study must 
be in  rough estimations, i t  could suggest some ground fo r  economic 
f e a s ib i l i t y  o f  the po licy  i f  the benefit-cost analysis is  to be 
regarded as an aid to  the public decision process--especially in the 
area o f public  health and safety or environment (9, p. 73).
The re s u l t  must be sens it ive  to dose-response function , there­
fore  the dose-response function f i t t e d  fo r  the Korean s itua t ion  must 
be developed. With the valuation o f other benefits , such as reduced 
damage to materia ls and amenity, the cost-effectiveness o f the policy 
would be more s trong ly  supported.
Table 16 
Annualized Benefits and Costs
Method* Benefi ts f 7%
Costsf
12%
Linear 1,163.8 283.13 302.75
Nonlinear 311.65 283.13 302.75
Dose-response func tion  fo r  SOg. 
^M il l io n  d o l la rs .
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ENDNOTE
^In Table 11, the expected reduction of emission is 23,772 
Ton/yr using the Gifford '72 model:
X = 50 X 
where Q* - 1.2 fig/m^.sec and
ut = 2.7 m/sec,
Q
u
t
then
* In the case of area sources, the total contribution of entire 
emission sources can be estimated by summing the estimates of individual 
parts, each consisting of a uniformly emitting area. U.S. EPA, Work­
book for Comparison of Air Quality Models, EPA-450/2-78-0286, OQPS 
No. 1.2-D97A (Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Laboratory, Office
of Research and Development, 1978), p. A14. Therefore, the Q. The 
emission rate in this case was calculated with the total emission of all 
grids of Seoul and based on an assumption of uniformly distributed 
emission sources. The calculation follows:
Reduction of emission 23772 X lpl2 yg 31356 X lo" sec
2 reduction of emission Emission rate per m = -------  ^........ . .
__________23772 X i p i 2 _____
(31356 X 10^) X (627 x i c f )
= 1.20224 ug/m^.sec.
tThe mean wind speed of Seoul area. National Institute of 
Environment, The Atmospheric Dispersion of Air Pollutants in Seoul 
(Seoul, Korea: The Republic of Korea, 1980), pp. 36-37.
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